A secure data outsourcing scheme based on Asmuth-Bloom secret sharing Data outsourcing is an emerging paradigm for data management in which a database is provided as a service by third party service providers. One of the major benefits of offering database as a service is to provide organizations, which are unable to purchase expensive hardware and software to host their databases, with efficient data storage accessible online at a cheap rate. Despite that, several issues of data confidentiality, integrity, availability and efficient indexing of users' queries at the server side have to be addressed in the data outsourcing paradigm.
Introduction
The rapid increase in the amount of data held by organizations has drastically increased the cost of in-house data management. Services providers that share resources across different organizations are therefore required in order to reduce the cost [1] . In-house data management cost was estimated to be 5-10 times higher than the initial acquisition cost Apart from providing data as a service, the data outsourcing model has been incorporated in many real-time applications to solve users' privacy issues. As an example, several data outsourcing paradigms have been proposed to address the privacy issue that exists in Online Social Networks [28, 29] such as flyByNight [5] , faceCloak [30] and Cloud-based OSN projects [31] .
This paper proposes a new data outsourcing scheme based on Asmuth-Bloom Secret Sharing (ABSS) [32] . ABSS is a threshold scheme based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem. It requires O(r) modular operations to recover a shared data as compared with other secret sharing schemes such as Shamir Secret Sharing which is sensitive to error and uses an interpolation formula that requires O(rlog 2 r) operations.
ABSS is secure in the sense that no useful information can be recovered out of (r -1)
shares. ABSS can be modified to include the option of checking the validity of the shared outsourced data before recovery [32] . For the previously mentioned advantages of ABSS, this paper proposes a new data outsourcing scheme based on ABSS that addresses several security challenges existing in data outsourcing, namely, availability, confidentiality and order preservation efficiently. There are other schemes that offer one [8, 9] or two [19, 21] of these characteristics, however, our proposed scheme supports all three characteristics in an efficient and computationally less expensive manner.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses the data outsourcing model. Section III gives a detailed review of related work. Section IV discusses the secret sharing scheme using Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT). Section V presents a direct implementation of the Asmuth-Bloom secret sharing scheme in data outsourcing. In Section VI, an enhanced data outsourcing model based on the AsmuthBloom secret sharing scheme is proposed. Then, Section VII presents a security analysis of the proposed scheme. Finally, the paper concludes in Section VIII.
Data outsourcing model
A data outsourcing model [34] consists of the following entities depicted in Figure 1 .
 Data owner: the entity that owns the data and wishes to outsource it.
 User: an entity that needs to access the outsourced data published by the data owner.
 Service provider: an entity that stores and manages the outsourced data.
 Client: the only party trusted by all the entities involved in a data outsourcing scenario. The client transforms queries presented by users into equivalent queries that operate on the encrypted database stored on the server side.
The data owner and the clients rely upon the service provider for the availability of the outsourced data. However, the confidentiality of the outsourced data is not trusted with the service provider as it may contain sensitive information that the data owner needs to reveal only to authorized users. Therefore, it is necessary to prevent the service provider from having unauthorized access to the outsourced data. owner encrypts his/her data and outsources it to the third party service provider where it will be stored and managed in an encrypted form. Whenever a user wants to access the outsourced data, he/she sends his/her query to the client where it will be transformed to a corresponding query that can work on the encrypted data at the server side. The server then responds to the request and sends the encrypted result back to the client, where it will be decrypted, further processed and finally sent to the user.
Related works
A lot of techniques were designed to support queries on encrypted relational databases and to protect the outsourced database against compromises in confidentiality, integrity and availability. However, some of these techniques have certain limitations which make them inefficient.
The table below illustrates a simple database example used throughout this paper.
It is a database of employees' information. The data owner may outsource this database to multiple Data Service Providers (DSPj). S/N  Fname  Salary  1  Alicia  10  2  Bob  18  3  Carol  21  4  Danna  36  5  Ebe  67  6  Frank  69  7  Gabza  71  8  Habu  81  9  Ibro  93  10 Joseph 238
Encryption based indexing approach
Database encryption refers to the use of encryption techniques to transform a plaintext database into an encrypted database, thus making it unreadable to anyone except those who possess the decryption key [8] .
Encryption protects the exposure of sensitive information even if the server is compromised, and ensures its integrity since data tampering can be detected. Data decryption cannot be executed at the server side, therefore solutions have been developed that allow the server to execute queries directly on the encrypted data [12] .
In [8] , an encryption approach is employed in which the attributes of the relation are encrypted and used as an index. The advantages of this approach are:
 It supports the confidentiality service.
 It supports equality. As an example, searching for a tuple in an outsourced encrypted data whose attribute a1 value in Table 1 is equal to 10 will be directly translated by the client into searching for a tuple in the encrypted relation whose I1 value is equal to Ek(10) [25] .
The limitations of this approach are:
 It does not support range queries because conventional encryption need not be order preserving [27] .
 It does not support availability.
Homomorphic encryption
Homomorphic encryption is a form of encryption that allows mathematical operations to be performed on encrypted data without compromising the encryption, and the result when decrypted should match the operations on the plaintext.
Homomorphic encryption is desirable in modern communication system
architectures especially in Cloud Computing [8] . This is because it can allow the chaining of different services together without exposing the data to each of those services [35] . For example, a chain of different services from different companies could be: calculate the tax, the currency exchange rate and the shipping. All of these services are needed within a single transaction without exposing the unencrypted data to any of them [36] . This feature makes this scheme good in providing confidentiality of an outsourced data, though it does not preserve its order due to the encryption process.
In [9] , a privacy homomorphic encryption that allows basic arithmetic operations to be performed over encrypted data is employed. In this scheme two functions α and β are defined over the domains of unencrypted and encrypted values respectively. If A is a domain of unencrypted values, Ek is an encryption function with key k, and Dk is the corresponding decryption function, then (Ek, Dk, α, β) can be defined as a privacy homomorphism if:
To add two values a1 and a2 which are encrypted and stored at the server side the system goes through the following steps; assuming Ek(ai) = ( ai mod p, ai mod q) while (p, q) are prime numbers representing the shared secret key k between owner and client): 
 The client finally decrypt the result using the function (d1qq
which is the addition of a1 to a2.
The advantages of homomorphic encryption are:
 It supports confidentiality.
 It supports equality, aggregation and logical operations on the outsourced data [9] .
 It is computationally expensive due to its dependence on PKI [10] .
 It does not preserve the order of the outsourced data so it cannot execute range queries.
 It does not support the availability service.
Partitioned based indexing approach
In this approach the attribute domain Di is partitioned into contiguous subsets of values of the same size without overlapping. Each partition is augmented with a label in an ordered or random manner in the domain Di.
In [25] , an architecture is proposed based on a partition based indexing approach.
It comprises of three entities: a user, a server and a client (similar to Figure 1) . A user poses a query to a client to transform it to an equivalent query that can run on encrypted data at the server side. The encrypted database is augmented with an index to make the encrypted data queryable. Based on the index, a technique is developed to split the user's query over encrypted data into 2 queries; a server query runs on the encrypted data and a client query runs on the client side to post-process the results obtained from the server query. To split the query, three functions are introduced: a partitioning function, an identification function and a mapping function.
 The partition function splits the domain values of attributes into partitions of equal length using a histogram construction technique (e.g. MaxDiff [37] or equi-depth [38] ) such that it covers the whole domain.
 The identification function assigns a unique identifier to each of these partitions.
To avoid collisions, a collision free hash function can be used for this purpose.
 The mapping function maps each of the partitions to its identifier.
The advantages of this approach are:
 It allows server evaluation of the equality condition [34] .
 The partitioning of the domain values into contiguous subsets makes it possible to partially preserve the order of the outsourced data [34] .
 It can produce spurious tuples. Spurious tuples are tuples that satisfy the correspondent query condition over the indexes of the outsourced data but do not satisfy the query condition over the original plaintext [34] . These spurious tuples need to be further processed and eliminated at the client side.
 It partially supports range queries [34] .
Hash based indexing
The hash based indexing technique uses as an index the result of a secure hash function over the attribute values of a relation. The hash function can be adapted for different granularities of the presented data. As an example if the co-domain C of the hash function is small compared to the number of attribute values, the hash function distributes the tuples uniformly in |C| buckets.
With respect to direct encryption, hash based indexing provides more confidentiality, however, it does not preserve the order of the outsourced data. When hashing is used, different plaintext values are mapped onto the same index, so the query results often produce spurious tuples that need to be further processed by the client [26] .
As an example, consider the relation in Table 2 of an encrypted employee  It is more confidential than direct encryption based indexing [5] .
 It allows server side evaluation of the equality condition. As an example each condition aij = v, where v is a constant value is transformed into a condition Iij = h(v), where Iij is the index corresponding to aij in the encrypted relation [5] .
The limitations of hash based indexing are:
 It produces spurious tuples in cases where the hash function is not collision free, which adds a burden to the client side [34] .
 It is not order preserving, therefore it does not support range queries [34] .
B + tree indexing approach
A B+ tree can be viewed as a B-tree [39] in which each node contains only keys (not keyvalue pairs), and to which an additional level is added at the bottom with linked leaves. It consists of leaves, internal nodes and a root. The root may be either a leaf or a node with two or more children. The main essence of a B+ tree is in storing data for efficient data processing operations [40] .
Damiani et al. [8] , propose an indexing method based on the B+ tree that can be attached to an encrypted database, which can be used by the server to select the data to be returned in response to a query without the need for disclosing the database content.
Given an internal vertex storing f key values k1,…,kf with f ≤ n-1, each key value ki is followed by a pointer pi, and k1 is preceded by a pointer p0. Pointer p0 points to the subtree that contains keys with values lower than k1, pf points to the sub-tree that contains keys with values greater than or equal to kf, and each pi points to the sub-tree that contains To search for a tuple with key k in B+ tree, the client starts searching from the root vertex, which is a tuple with Id = 1, retrieves it and decrypts it to see whether it satisfies the given condition. If not, it then traverses through the nodes, and at each node retrieves the content of the vertex and decrypts it until the leaf containing the key k is found.
This kind of indexing approach provides both confidentiality and order preservation, as the outsourced data is stored encrypted with a B+ tree built over the most queried attribute for efficient data processing operation. However, it does not support availability. The advantages of the B+ tree indexing approach [34] are:
 It supports confidentially.
 It is secure against inference attacks, since the B+ tree content itself is encrypted.
 It supports equality queries.
 It is order preserving so it can support range queries.
 It does not produce spurious tuples.
 It allows the evaluation of ORDER-BY and GROUP-BY clauses of SQL queries.
The limitations of the B+ tree indexing approach are:
 B+ tree indexing is expensive for the client compared to bucket and hash based.
Several trips (as many as the levels we have in the B+ tree) between the client and the server are needed to retrieve the required tuples [8] .
 It does not support the availability service. Figure 2 . Example of the B+ tree indexing approach
Order preservation encryption scheme (OPES)
The idea behind OPES is that unique values are generated from a user specified target distribution and sorted in a table T. Then the i th plaintext (pi) value in the sorted list of |P| plaintexts is encrypted into the i th value in the sorted list of |P| values obtained from the user's specified target distribution. This makes the scheme good in preserving the order of the encrypted data and also provides confidentiality. To decrypt any of the ciphertext a lookup into a reverse map is required [27] . In this case the table T is the encryption key that must be kept secret.
OPES uses three stages to encrypt a database: 
Model stage:
In this stage the input and the target distributions are modeled as piece wise linear splines using either of the following techniques.
 Histogram technique: this technique captures statistical information about the data value distributions using counters for a specified number of data value buckets [42]  Parametric technique: this technique approximates data value distributions by fitting the parameters of a given type of function (e.g. polynomial of a given maximum degree) [42] .
In [43] , the two modeling techniques were used to first of all partition the values into buckets using the histogram-based technique then model the distribution within each bucket as a linear spline (a linear spline of a bucket is a line connecting the densities at the two end points of a bucket) using the parametric technique.
Flatten stage:
In this stage the plaintext database P is transformed into a flat database f such that values in f are uniformly distributed. In cases where a bucket has dense plaintext, the bucket will be stretched so that the density of the plaintext in the flattened bucket will be uniform.
Transform stage:
In this stage the flattened database is transformed into a cipher database C such that the values in C are distributed according to the target distribution.
As an example, if we have pi and pj where pi < pj, this will be transformed to fi < fj in the flatten stage, and finally the flattened buckets will be transformed to a uniformly distributed cipher database ci < cj. ( i.e. Pi < Pj ⇒ fi < fj ⇒ Ci < Cj)
In [44] , an order preserving indexing scheme over encrypted data is proposed [46, 47] .
The advantages of the OPES indexing approach are [27] :
 It is order preserving.
 It produces exact results for the query without any spurious tuples.
 It can handle updates, without the need for re-encryption.
The limitations of the OPES indexing approach are:
 It is vulnerable to tight estimation and statistical attacks [45] .
 It is vulnerable to chosen plaintext attacks [45] .
Information dispersal algorithms (IDAs)
IDAs were first proposed by Michael O. Rabin in 1989 to protect data sent over the network or sitting in storage arrays and not to be accessed except by the right user [48] .
In IDAs, a file is split into n pieces where a minimum m pieces (n > m) are required for reconstructing the original file. A transform matrix of n rows and m columns is used to transform the original file into n pieces [47] .
In a salted IDA, confidentiality is achieved by using a modified IDA scheme. A salted IDA depends on randomness to improve data confidentiality. While it relies on the original IDA scheme to provide data availability [50] .
A transform matrix TM of (n x m) is maintained by the client as the information After decoding the encoded data retrieved from m non-faulty servers, the client reconstructs the salts by calling fs and then deducts these salts from the decoded data entries, recovering D. Figure 3 : Framework for dispersing data in a cloud using salts [50] The advantages of the IDA are [50] :
 It provides a confidentiality service.
 It is order preserving, and as such it supports range queries.
 It supports availability.
 It does not produce spurious tuples.
 It is secured against statistical analysis of the encrypted data.
The limitations of the IDA are [50] :
 For every query the whole column where the candidate answer tuple is located has to be retrieved.
 It is expensive for the client. Table 3 compares the reviewed approaches in the literature based on six criteria: support for equality queries and/or range queries, the cost of performing operations at the client side, returning spurious tuples, data availability and data confidentiality. It is obvious that none of the aforementioned approaches are able to adequately address all the data outsourcing issues. Every approach has some limitations. This motivates us to propose a new data outsourcing scheme that tries to address all the issues. 
A secret sharing scheme using Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT)
A secret sharing algorithm is one of the prominent techniques widely used in data outsourcing [3, 15, 29, 55] . It is an ideal scheme for storing sensitive and highly important information. Traditional encryption methods, as discussed earlier, are not efficient for achieving a high level of confidentiality and availability at the same time.
The aim of this paper is to explore a secret sharing algorithm based on the Chinese
Reminder Theorem (CRT) to provide data availability, confidentiality and order preservation for outsourced data.
The secret sharing scheme based on CRT produces shares presented in congruence equations and the secret can be recovered by solving the system of congruencies to get a unique solution, which is the original outsourced data. Secret sharing schemes that are based on CRT are proved by Quisquater et el [49] to be asymptotically perfect schemes [51] .
CRT Theorem:
Suppose that m1, m2, …, mk are pairwise relatively prime positive integers. Then for any given integers a1, a2, …, ak, the following system of simultaneous congruencies
has a unique solution x modulo the product M = m1…mk. This is given by:
Asmuth-Bloom threshold scheme
Asmuth-Bloom secret sharing is a threshold scheme that is based on CRT. It was proposed with the intent of safeguarding a key [34] . In this scheme, a key K is decomposed into n shares Ii (congruence classes of a number associated with the original key), in such a way that the key is only recoverable from any r ≤ n of the shares, and no useful information can be recovered from (r -1) shares.
The value of this scheme depends on the following features [34] :
 the efficiency of decomposition and recoverability of the key,  the sensitivity of the method to random error or deliberate tempering,  the relationship between the number of shares (n), the minimum number of shares required to recover the secret (r) and the number of shares that is not enough to recover the secret (r -1).
The Asmuth-Bloom threshold scheme consists of two phases [52] :
 Environmental formation phase  Secret recovery phase.
Environmental formation phase:
This phase consists of two stages:
Initialization stage: In this stage, a set of integers {p, m1, m2, …, mn} are chosen subject to the following conditions:
In this stage, the decomposition process goes as follows: 
Secret recovery phase:
Suppose we have a system of congruencies Ii ≡ K (mod mi). The secret K can be uniquely recovered using a constructive algorithm as follows [53] :
 compute the product of the r primes that are required to recover the secret as
M=m1m2…mr
 for each prime compute =  use an Extended Euclidean Algorithm to find the integers αi and γi such that:
ei in the above equation guarantees that its remainder when divided by mi must be
Hence, the system of congruencies has one solution that is = ∑ =0 based on CRT. Shares construction in the Asmuth-Bloom secret sharing scheme has a complexity of Olog(r) [49] .
The Asmuth-Bloom scheme can be modified to provide a validity check and a deliberate tempering of the shares. To make the scheme perform a validity check to the shares of the key, the second condition of the initialization stage has to be weakened to allow gcd(mi, mj ) = qij where qij ≠ 1.
As an example if Ii and Ij are known and gcd(mi, mj)
= qij, then for the correct shares Ii ≡ Ij (mod qij).
If there is an error in Ii, this will alter its congruencies class modulo all of the qij, therefore the error free shares would be in general agreement with each other and those in error can be discarded [32] .
Direct implementation of Asmuth-Bloom secret sharing schema in data outsourcing
This section proposes a new data outsourcing scheme based on Asmuth-Bloom threshold secret sharing. It consists of three stages:
Setup:
In this stage the data owner performs the following steps:
 choose a set of prime integers {p, m1, m2, …, mn} based on the following conditions: 
Outsourcing:
To distribute the database to multiple DSP servers, the data owner performs the following step:
 compute ′ values for each Ii as the following ′ ≡ ( ) and then distribute them to n service providers along with the encrypted database.
The essence of each ′ value is to serve as an order-preserving index for the encrypted database outsourced to the j th server.
Retrieving:
To retrieve the outsourced encrypted data, the server uses the modulus as an index to retrieve the encrypted data and decrypt it at the client side.
The example below illustrates how this scheme can be used to build an index on the salary attribute of the employee database (Table 1) . Assume the data owner needs to outsource the database of his/her employees to five different service providers (DSPj).
Let m1=101, m2=103, m3=107, m4=109, m5=111, p=45, β=3. Table 4 column 3  Then the salary can be shared using ′ ≡ ( ) as shown in Table 4 columns (4-8) In the previous works, we can see that outsourcing by encrypting the whole data without building order-preserving indexes is prohibitive in terms of performance and does not solve the problem of availability. In contrast, ABSS can be used to create n shares and distribute it to different service providers as shown in Table 4 . We can use these shares as indexes in various DSPs in order to achieve the following advantages:
 Partially preserve the order of the outsourced data (when di < p) to support range queries.
 Support equality queries.
 Reduce the computational cost of encryption.
 Reduce the burden of encrypting and decrypting on the client when making a query.
From Figure 4 , we can extract the limitations of the direct implementation to this scheme as follows:
 from an employee with id = 1 to that with id = 4, the order of the index was Due to the issues raised in the direct implementation of ABSS in data outsourcing, the next section proposed an enhanced data outsourcing model based on ABSS that mitigates the aforementioned issues of direct implementation.
Enhanced data outsourcing model based on Asmuth-Bloom scheme
In this section, we have enhanced the direct implementation of Asmuth Bloom secret sharing to counteract its security threats. The enhanced scheme involves the following stages:
Setup:
In this stage the data owner initializes the data outsourcing environment through the following steps:
 choose an increasing polynomial function f(di) (a function applied on the attribute values (di)) in which the variable is the attribute values to be outsourced and the coefficients are secrets to be selected by the data owner and shared with the client.
Without loss of generality let us assume a degree 2 polynomial function of the following form:
The  choose a set of prime integers {p, m1, m2, …, mn} such that : Outsourcing:
To distribute the database to multiple DSP servers, the data owner performs the following steps:
 compute the quotients qi = Ii div mj and the modulus ′ ≡ ( ) for all the attribute values,  encrypt the modulus ′ and store it with the unencrypted quotient qi.
The essence of the introduced polynomial function f is to enhance system security as the coefficients are extra secrets known only to the data owner and the client. It is also used to enlarge the data to give a chance of selecting large co-prime integers mj.
The quotient of the data is used as an index to maintain the order of the stored information at the server side, which will consequently help in supporting spurious-less range queries. The modulus is encrypted to keep the data secured as (mj)s are selected big enough to make the quotient alone not sufficient to estimate the actual data.
Selecting large co-primes also helps in enhancing security because it increases the range that the modulus can take before it wraps around and thus reduces the chance of the adversary obtaining the modulus even in an unencrypted form.
Retrieving:
To retrieve the outsourced data the client performs the following steps:
 convert the queried data value into n quotient based query Let us illustrate how the scheme can be applied on the Employees table (Table 1) .
Setup:
 let f(di) = adi 2 + bdi + c: the coefficients a=2, b=1 and c=1 as shown in Table 5  let p = 45, m1 =101, m2 = 103, m3 = 107, m4 =109, m5 =111
 let β=3  compute Ii = f(di) + β.p for each attribute value di as shown in Table 5 1  10  211  346  2  18  667  802  3  21  904  1039  4  36  2629  2764  5  67  9046  9181  6  69  9592  9727  7  71  10154  10289  8  81  13204  13339  9  93  17392  17527  10  238  113527  113662 Outsourcing:
 compute the quotients qi and modulus for each di  encrypt the modulus and disperse it to the servers as shown in Table 6 . Retrieving:
To illustrate how this scheme can be used to retrieve outsourced data from the server, an example query to Table 6 for the salary d1 = 10 is used. ⇒ I1 = -37845768 mod (101×103×107) = 346
 solves the equation (2d1 2 + d1 + 1 = 211) to obtain d1 ⇒ d1 = 10 or d1 = -10.5 Table 7 shows the same criteria as Table 3 . It can be seen that the proposed scheme satisfies all criteria. It is more efficient compared to the previously reviewed ones in that it can jointly support equality and range queries, guarantees less burden on the client compared to some of previous approaches such as B+ tree indexing, produces no spurious tuples and also provides data availability and confidentiality.
Although IDA addresses many of the data outsourcing issues as shown in Table   3 , however, the shares of IDA contain part of the original data that can be of use to a third party [33] . By snooping, an eavesdropper who obtains fewer than the threshold shares may reconstruct some part of the original data explicitly resulting in partial data leakage [56] . In contrast, no single share in the proposed approach can reveal information about the original data. Moreover, IDA places extra burden on the client side since it uses the B+ tree, which demands a lot of trips between the server and the client. This makes it less efficient compared to the proposed approach. Thus, the proposed Asmuth-Bloom secret sharing data outsourcing scheme provides more confidentiality and better performance when compared to IDA. 
Security analysis
This section discusses different attack scenarios that can be launched successfully against some of the reviewed schemes. Then it shows how the proposed scheme is secured against such attacks.
Scenario 1:
An attacker succeeds in launching a Denial of Service attack against one or two of the servers involved in the outsourcing service. He/she cannot cripple the overall system, as only r out of the n servers are required to retrieve the outsourced data, and not all of them.
Thus, the proposed scheme is secure against a DoS attack to a few of the servers and can maintain service availability.
Scenario 2:
An internal/external attacker might try to gain knowledge of the secrets (primes) by launching an inference attack, as the modulus values may expose the range of the secrets.
However, the proposed scheme is secured against such attacks, since the modulus values are stored encrypted at the server side to preserve the confidentiality of the outsourced data.
Scenario 3:
An attacker succeeds in obtaining the order-preserved indexes of the outsourced data.
Even so, he/she cannot gain any kind of knowledge about the original outsourced data since these indexes were obtained as a result of a function applied on the original attribute values. The coefficients of this function are shared secrets between the data owner and the client only. Thus, the proposed scheme preserves the order of the outsourced data without revealing information about the original data.
Scenario 4:
An adversary might try to obtain the indexes and the modulus values of different tuples from the same server, or the modulus values of the same tuple from different servers, in order to form linear equations that can be solved simultaneously so as to reveal the outsourced data. This kind of attack is not feasible in the proposed scheme as the modulus values are stored encrypted.
Scenario 5:
If an adversary, in scenario 4, has further succeeded in obtaining the unencrypted modulus values, he/she is still going to have more unknowns (the outsourced data and the scheme's primes) than the number of equations that he/she can form. Therefore, it will be computationally infeasible to get a deterministic solution.
Conclusion
Data outsourcing is a new paradigm that has gained a high popularity recently but it is hindered by some security challenges from gaining wide spread acceptance. The security challenges include: data confidentiality, availability and order preservation of the outsourced data. Data confidentiality is mostly achieved using a traditional encryption scheme, but traditional encryption is not good in preserving the order of the outsourced data, which is an important property that is needed in data outsourcing. Availability is another issue as the data loss can affect the business of the data owner. Data availability is usually achieved by duplicating the data and storing it at different servers.
This paper analyses some of the previous work in data outsourcing, and shows the advantages and limitations of each. It then proposes a secure data outsourcing scheme based on Asmuth-Bloom secret sharing, which uses congruence classes and the Chinese Remainder Theorem to solve the aforementioned issues. Firstly, we proposed a direct implementation of this scheme that consists of three stages: setup, outsourcing and retrieving. In the setup stage the data owner chooses a set of prime integers known only to him/her and his/her client; in the data outsourcing stage the data owner outsources the encrypted attribute values and its modulus, where the modulus is used as an index. In the retrieving stage the client uses the index to retrieve the encrypted data and decrypt it at the client side. However, the direct implementation is expensive for the client as it produces spurious tuples. It is also vulnerable to statistical analysis attacks that can expose the used secret primes.
Finally, an enhanced scheme is proposed that also consists of three stages. In the setup stage, an increasing polynomial function is introduced to enlarge the attribute values. This allows larger co-prime integers to be selected so as to increase the modulus range before it wraps around, thus reducing the chance of an adversary obtaining the modulus value even in an unencrypted form. In the outsourcing stage, the data owner outsources the encrypted modulus and the quotient of the attribute values, to various servers for availability. The quotient is used as an index to keep the order of the outsourced encrypted modulus. To retrieve any value, the client retrieves the encrypted values, decrypts them and constructs the modulus using the CRT constructive algorithm.
The proposed scheme is computationally efficient as it uses simple modular arithmetic. It is more secure as the index is generated after wrapping the outsourced data by a polynomial function whose coefficients are kept secret. It also produces no spurious tuples and provides availability and confidentiality. In addition, it is an order-preserving scheme, which further reduces the burden of encryption and decryption of every query.
Because of all its properties, the proposed scheme is strongly recommended as an efficient tool for real data outsourcing scenarios.
